The Piezoelectric Glitching Attack

Many readers will be familiar with the idea of a glitching attack, introducing electrical noise into a computer circuit in the hope of disrupting program flow and causing unexpected behaviour which might lead to hitherto unavailable access to memory or other system resources. [David Buchanan] has written a piece investigating glitching attacks on PC memory, and the tool he’s used is the ubiquitous piezoelectric lighter.

Attaching a short piece of wire to one of the lines on a SODIMM memory module, he can glitch a laptop at will with the lighter through the electromagnetic noise its discharge creates. It’s a cool trick, but the real meat of the write-up lies in his comprehensive description of how virtual memory works, and how a glitch can be used to break out of the “sandbox” of memory allocated to a particular process. He demonstrates it in a video which we’ve placed below the break, in which he gains root access and runs an arbitrary piece of code on a Linux laptop. It’s probable that not many of us have the inclination to do this for ourselves, but even so it’s fascinating to know how such an attack works.

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This Week In Security: Zimbra, DNS Poisoning, And Perfctl

Up first this week is a warning for the few of us still brave enough to host our own email servers. If you’re running Zimbra, it’s time to update, because CVE-2024-45519 is now being exploited in the wild.

That vulnerability is a pretty nasty one, though thankfully requires a specific change from default settings to be exposed. The problem is in postjournal. This logging option is off by default, but when it’s turned on, it logs incoming emails. One of the fields on an incoming SMTP mail object is the RCPT TO: field, with the recipients made of the to, cc, and bcc fields. When postjournal logs this field, it does so by passing it as a bash argument. That execution wasn’t properly sanitized, and wasn’t using a safe call like execvp(). So, it was possible to inject commands using the $() construction.

The details of the attack are known, and researchers are seeing early exploratory attempts to exploit this vulnerability. At least one of these campaigns is attempting to install webshells, so at least some of those attempts have teeth. The attack seems to be less reliable when coming from outside of the trusted network, which is nice, but not something to rely on.

New Tool Corner

What is that binary doing on your system? Even if you don’t do any security research, that’s a question you may ask yourself from time to time. A potential answer is WhoYouCalling. The wrinkle here is that WYC uses the Windows Event Tracing mechanism to collect the network traffic strictly from the application in question. So it’s a Windows only application for now. What you get is a packet capture from a specific executable and all of its children processes, with automated DNS capture to go along. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Zimbra, DNS Poisoning, And Perfctl”

MikroPhone – Open, Secure, Simple Smartphone

Modern smartphones try and provide a number of useful features to their users, and yet, they’re not exactly designed with human needs in mind. A store-bought smartphone will force a number of paradigms and features onto you no matter whether you want them, and, to top it off, it will encroach on your privacy and sell your data. It’s why self-built and hacker-friendly smartphone projects keep popping up, and the MikroPhone project fills a new niche for sure, with its LTE connectivity making it a promising option for all hackers frustrated with the utter state of smartphones today.

MikroPhone is open-source in every single aspect possible, and it’s designed to be privacy-friendly and easy to understand. At its core is a SiFive Freedom E310, a powerful RISC-V microcontroller – allowing for a feature phone-like OS that is easy to audit and hard to get bogged down by. You’re not limited to a feature phone OS, however – on the PCB, you will find a slot for an NXP i.MX8M-based module that can run a Linux-based mobile OS of your choice. MikroPhone’s display and touchscreen are shared between the Linux module and the onboard MCU, a trick that reminds us of the MCH2022 badge – you get as much “smartphone” as you currently need, no more, no less.

The cool features at MikroPhone’s core don’t end here. The MikroPhone has support for end-to-end encrypted communications, kept to its feature-phone layer, making for a high bar of privacy protection – even when the higher-power module might run an OS that you don’t necessarily fully trust. Currently, MikroPhone is a development platform, resembling the PinePhone’s Project Don’t Be Evil board back when PinePhone was just starting out, and just like with PinePhone, it wouldn’t be hard to minify this platform into a pocket-friendly form-factor, either. The PinePhone has famously become a decent smartphone replacement option in the hacker world, even helping kick off a few mobile OS projects and resulting in a trove of hacks to grace our pages.

Hacking Kia: Remotely Hijack A Car Using Only Its License Plate

These days everything needs to be connected to remote servers via the internet, whether it’s one’s TV, fridge or even that new car you just bought. A recently discovered (and already patched) vulnerability concerning Kia cars was a doozy in this regard, as a fairly straightforward series of steps allowed for any attacker to obtain the vehicle identification number (VIN) from the license plate, and from there become registered as the car’s owner on Kia’s network. The hack and the way it was discovered is described in great detail on [Sam Curry]’s website, along with the timeline of its discovery.

Notable is that this isn’t the first vulnerability discovered in Kia’s HTTP-based APIs, with [Sam] this time taking a poke at the dealer endpoints. To his surprise, he was able to register as a dealer and obtain a valid session ID using which he could then proceed to query Kia’s systems for a user’s registered email address and phone number.

With a specially crafted tool to automate the entire process, this information was then used to demote the car’s owner and register the attacker as the primary owner. After this the attacker was free to lock/unlock the doors, honk to his heart’s content, locate the car and start/stop the vehicle. The vulnerability affected all Kia cars made after 2013, with the victim having no indication of their vehicle having been hijacked in this manner. Aside from the doors randomly locking, the quaint honking and engine turning on/off at a whim, of course.

Perhaps the scariest part about this kind of vulnerability is that it could have allowed an attacker to identify a vulnerable parked car, gained access, before getting into the car, starting the engine and driving away. As long as these remote APIs allow for such levels of control, one might hope that one day car manufacturers will take security somewhat more serious, as this is only the latest in a seemingly endless series of amusingly terrifying security vulnerabilities that require nothing more than some bored hackers with HTTP query crafting tools to discover.

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This Week In Security: Password Sanity, Tank Hacking, And The Mystery 9.9

It looks like there’s finally hope for sane password policies. The US National Institue of Standards and Technology, NIST, has released a draft of SP 800-63-4, the Digital Identity Guideline.

There’s password guidance in there, like “SHALL NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types) for passwords” and “SHALL NOT require users to change passwords periodically.” NIST approved passwords must be at least 8 characters long, with a weaker recommendation of at least 15 characters. Security questions like name of first pet get the axe. And it’s strongly recommended that all ASCII and Unicode characters should be acceptable for passwords.

This is definitely moving in the right direction. NIST guidelines are only binding for government services and contractors, though they do eventually get picked up by banks and other industries. So there’s hope for sane password policies eventually.

Tank Hacking

Researchers at Bitsight are interested in infrastructure security, and they opted to take a closer look at Automatic Tank Gauging (ATG) systems. Those are found at gas stations, as well as any other facility that needs automated monitoring of liquids or gasses in a tank. There is an actual ATG message format, originally designed for RS-232 serial, and woefully unprepared for the interconnected present. The protocol allows for an optional security code, but it maxes out at only six alpha-numeric characters.

Among the vulnerabilities getting announced today, we have a pair of CVSS 10 command injection flaws, a quartet of 9.8 authentication bypass flaws, with one of those being a hardcoded credential — AKA a backdoor. The other CVSS9+ flaw is a SQL injection, with a trio of slightly less serious flaws. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Password Sanity, Tank Hacking, And The Mystery 9.9”

British Commuters Get Their WiFi Hacked

As if there weren’t enough worrying global news stories already, today the British press and media have been full of a story involving the public WiFi networks at some major railway stations. Instead of being faced with the usual don’t-be-naughty terms and conditions page, commuters were instead faced with a page that definitely shouldn’t have been there.

Hackaday readers will immediately have guessed what is likely to have happened. This is probably more of a compromise of the page than of the network itself, and, indeed, the BBC are reporting that it may have come via an administrator account at Network Rail’s er… network provider. Fortunately, it seems the intent was to spread a political message rather than malware, so perhaps those travelers got off lightly. The various companies involved have all got the proverbial egg on their faces, and we’re glad we don’t work in the IT department concerned.

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This Week In Security: Open Source C2, Raptor Trains, And End To End Encryption

Open Source has sort of eaten everything in software these days. And that includes malware, apparently, with open source Command and Control (C2) frameworks like Sliver and Havoc gaining traction. And of course, this oddball intersection of Open Source and security has intrigued at least one security researcher who has found some interesting vulnerabilities.

Before we dive into what was found, you may wonder why open source malware tools exist. First off, trustworthy C2 servers are quite useful for researchers, who need access to such tools for testing. Then there is Red Teaming, where a security professional launches a mock attack against a target to test its defenses. A C2 is often useful for education and hobby level work, and then there are the true criminals that do use these Open Source tools. It takes all types.

A C2 system consists of an agent installed on compromised systems, usually aiming for stealth. These agents connect to a central server, sending information and then executing any instructions given. And finally there’s a client, which is often just a web interface or even a command line interface.

Now what sort of fun is possible in these C2 systems? Up first is Sliver, written in Go, with a retro command line interface. Sliver supports launching Metasploit on compromised hosts. Turns out, it accidentally supported running Metasploit modules against the server’s OS itself, leading to an easy remote shell from an authenticated controller account.

Havoc has a fancy user interface for the clients, and also a command injection flaw. A service name field gets used to generate a shell command, so you’re only a simple escape away from running commands. That’s not quite as useful as the API that failed open when a bad username/password was given. Oops. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Open Source C2, Raptor Trains, And End To End Encryption”